INTRODUCTION
Are we private lawyers not convinced that we share a common understanding of "freedom of contract," of "freedom" 1 and "contract," and of restrictions on that freedom of contract through "regulation?"
2 Is this common understanding not the basis on which we all operate implicitly or explicitly in our intellectual discourse cutting across different legal traditions and different legal cultures?
3 At the very least, is not the notion of contract freedom shared in all countries governed by a market society and even more so if the market society is embedded into the Westernized model of democracy? 4 What if this common assumption turns out to be wrong or is no more than a rather superficial "gentleman's agreement," which allows us to communicate with each other whilst maintaining our own preconceptions? Digging deeper into intellectual history, legal theory, and legal philosophy reveals that, for example, a French lawyer and an English common lawyer may not necessarily be talking about the same thing when they argue about "freedom of contract." This becomes even more complicated if we look at the limitations and restrictions on "freedom of contract," which are set out via statutory regulation.
5
These lawyers might agree on what a state is by equating it with the "nation state," but might encounter more problems in understanding and agreeing on the meaning of "regulation." Regulation can be private or public. When created statutorily, regulation might facilitate or restrict freedom of contract. Statutory intervention, might, depending on one's perspective (liberal or welfarist), trigger very different expectations, feelings, or sentiments. Our perception of "regulation" very much depends on what we expect as citizens from "our" state.
This paper starts with two examples that are meant to highlight deeper cultural differences in deciding conflicting contractual issues. One example is taken from the French/German context, the other example is from the German/American context. These examples serve to underpin the hypothesis that the understanding of contract and regulation in the three countries under investigation -France, Germany and the United Kingdom -differs considerably and the reasons for the differences can be found in the intellectual history of the respective states. Further, this paper continues by contrasting the three different models of freedom of contract and regulation with the emerging European model. The hypothesis is that the European Union is yielding its own model which differs from the Member States model. This is not only due to the particular legal nature of the European Union as a quasi-state, but also to the changing economic and political environment after World War II. The conclusions remain tentative. The reader is invited to stand back and carefully look at the ongoing transformations of contract and regulation. Intellectual history and comparative research are the appropriate tools for such an exercise. Comparative lawyers who study these and other similar cases are aware of the differences between English common law and the French Civil Code.
11 However, the fact that a layperson, had they to decide the case, would come to the same result tells us something about our legal consciousness, and the deeper assumptions we share about our own legal systems based on the expectations we have in the functioning of the courts and of society, for good and for bad. The Eurobarometer is a neat indicator that allows for a deeper look into these differing preconceptions at least between the twenty-eight E.U. Member States. 12 We may speculate on what courts in the United States, Canada, Brazil, Israel, Italy, or Germany would have decided in a case similar to the English or French cases. I am sure there are similar, if not identical, cases, and I assume that a survey of the citizens of these countries would lead to results similar to my English-French comparison. 13 If my assumption is correct, there must be a deeper layer of rationales enshrined in long-grown cultures and traditions behind the legal rules. 
12
Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work. The surveys and studies address major topics concerning European citizenship: enlargement, social situation, health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, defence, etc. See, e.g., European Commission, Public Opinion, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
13
For example, the Trento Common Core Project is based on the idea that the same case is looked at through the eyes of different legal orders. THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, http://www.common-core.org/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
14 At this point in my paper, I do not argue that these rationales are "eternal" in the sense of Pierre Legrand's 18 This Directive obliges Member States to shield consumers from the bankruptcy of tour operators and shifts the risk of default from the individual traveler to the community of travelers. The risk is thereby socialized, as all potential travelers must cover the costs for a fund the tour operator provides. 19 The German state lost and its liability was later confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Dillenkofer. 20 This was a costly lesson for the German state which had to pay roughly 20 million German Marks (10 million Euros). Consumer organizations and consumer victims celebrated the judgment as a great success.
The societal dimension of the conflict underlying the case is of particular interest here. At the time of the intense debate on who should bear the costs of the stranded tourists, a German television 15 For the facts and the subsequent decision of the CJEU, see Joined Cases C-178, 179/94 & C-188-90/94, Dillenkofer v. Germany, 1996 E.C.R. I-4845. 16 Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 program invited several of the stranded tourists and an American lawyer to discuss the proper remedy in the case. When given the opportunity to tell their stories, the German tourists said that, since a single return ticket cost three to four times more than the package tour, they went to the German embassy asking for financial support. At some point during the television program, the American lawyer asked the stranded tourists and the listeners a simple question: why not charter a plane? The lawyer suggested that chartering a plane would have been much less expensive for both the stranded tourists and for Germany.
The lawyer's question brings to light the expectations of German citizens, particularly the economically suspect deal of two weeks holidays in Florida for 500 to 600 German Marks. The tourists trusted the contract adage that a deal is a deal. Maybe the tourists subconsciously were also convinced that the German state would bail them out if their contractual expectations turned out to be wrong. Would consumers of a state other than Germany have had the same expectations of their contract with a package tour operator and of their state? Similarly, would these consumers have bombarded their embassies with complaints, or would they have chartered a plane? I assume that the expectations differ considerably.
However, there is more at stake than the help provided by national embassies for stranded citizens. As a result of the Francovich doctrine, E.U. law equips all E.U. citizens with individually enforceable rights to force their state to pay for the transfer, provided the respective state has not implemented, or has not correctly implemented, the Directive on package tours. How is this possible? It is not that the Member States accept liability voluntarily. Instead, it is the European Union which imposes such liability on Member States via the CJEU. Thus, the regulation of package tours by the European Union not only sets boundaries for the freedom of package tour operators, who are forced to abide by the E.U. rules when exercising their economic activity, but also paves the way for more entrepreneurial freedom in a European market. TAGEBLATT (1985) . The method applied was a functional comparison by looking for the "best solution," or the solution that best fit the differing traditions of the states. What is more important here was the pedagogical message inherent to the idea of legal families. Engaging in comparative law and comparative legal method requires not only knowledge of the language, but also knowledge of the country and the cultural foundations of the respective societies. This kind of knowledge, however, must be gained through training and education in the country itself. In that spirit, I benefited from the opportunity to study law in Switzerland (the French speaking part), France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy. Today, such a rigorous training requirement seems old-fashioned, as comparative lawyers have to engage in the comparison of countries and legal systems even if they know neither the language nor have fully experienced the country's culture. The E.U. promoted this type of approach through its insistence on "inclusion," which does not follow the traditional division of legal families, but converges the legal orders of twentyeight Member States. This approach leads to a comparison of legal systems via simplistic methods, such as tables and charts. I admit that I have been involved in this more modern approach. Interestingly enough, legal origin theory (LOT) took the legal families approach seriously, which could have reinvigorated the approach of Zweigert and Kötz. The analysis of the notion of freedom contract should begin with the Roman law. We can refer to the history of Roman law, and how its foundations have survived the last 2,000 years in both continental and common law countries; 26 however, the historical ground might be less stable and less safe than its promoters pretend.
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Regulation is much more complicated. The Roman Empire used what today we call "regulation" to govern the economy. "Regulations," whether back then or now, have almost always been associated with the existence of a state and a territory. This brings us to the Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, which laid the foundations for what later became the nation state.
The benchmark for the beginning or the reinvigoration of Roman law is the foundation of the University of Bologna around 1130/1140 and the scholastic school of law. According to Harold Berman, the conflict between Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor, a century earlier over the independence of the Church from the temporal power heralded and triggered the reestablishment of Roman law, private law, and contract law.
28 Berman argues that the separation of spiritual and temporal power not only initiated early state building and paved the way for the development of the nation state after the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, but also led to the creation of the scholastic school of law first in Bologna and then elsewhere in Europe. 29 The Crusades between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries led to a stronger intellectual exchange between the West and the East through the reinvigoration of Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as through 30 Hence, there is a connection between the rediscovery of Roman law, the split of spiritual and temporal power, and the Crusades, which renders the intellectual history of Western law to that époque indispensable.
One might alternatively argue that the starting point of my undertaking could and should be the discovery of the Americas in the fifteenth century and the conflict between the Spanish and English empires, without which the deeper intellectual history of the United States cannot be fully understood. New research initiated by Thomas Duve, the Director of the Max-Planck-Institut at Frankfurt am Main, emphasizes the cultural, political, and economic interaction and interchange between Europe and the "New World," or the two Americas.
31 My approach is more modest and is more closely tied to my European cultural roots, the younger history of codified continental law, and the established role of the state in the economy and society. This paper owes its origins to an invitation to speak on social justice in private law at the Cour de Cassation in Paris.
32 Thinking about justice in the French academic and judicial environment must coincide-at least this is what I am convinced of-with an analysis of the connection between state-building and constitution-building, as well as private legal order building and codification in the aftermath of the French revolution 1789. Whilst such a starting point offers joint perspectives in comparing France and Germany, it falls short by not taking the United Kingdom into account. If anything, a parallel may be drawn between the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century and German state-building of the nineteenth century on the one hand, and the Civil War and the conflict between the English Crown and Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth century on the other. This period, i.e. the seventeenth throughout the nineteenth century, is roughly the period I investigated in attempting to explain where the different patterns of freedom of social justice derive from. I use these findings 30 See id. 31 See Duve, supra note 27. Table 1 illustrates my understanding of freedom of contract and regulation, rooted in intellectual history. This section will first explain the categorization of England, France, Germany, and the European Union.
33 I will then provide a rough account of the socio-economic and political background to the different models of autonomy and regulation in those three countries and the European Union, thereby elaborating on the characteristics of the many faces of freedom of contract in a bottom-up perspective.
33
The following analysis is a developed and adjusted version of Hans-W. Micklitz, supra note 23. In English history there is no comparable event to the adoption of the Civil Code in France or in Germany. The civil war that took place in the seventeenth century in England led to major changes in society and the parliamentarian system. However, the English Civil War neither yielded a constitution nor a coherent codified body of civil law; rather, it only made way for the Declaration of the Bill of Rights in 1689. The French and the German legal systems, as seen through the eyes of a common law lawyer (daring to suggest that this is possible for me, a civil law lawyer), share a relatively homogenous view on the role and function of freedom of contract in society. These legal systems are united in the idea of universal values that infiltrate legal principles and concepts. "Autonomy" or "autonomie" is at the core of these values, and this is exactly where common lawyers run into difficulties.
34
The true difference between continental law and common law dates further back than the French revolution, and it was crucial to identify the point at which the continental and common law systems diverged. I considered the clash between different philosophies, and to the remaining influence of the scholastic in continental Europe and its growing critique through nominalism in the United Kingdom. I also considered that the divergence occurred during medieval times when the relative cultural unity of Europe broke into pieces.
35 Therefore, I think empiricism is responsible for the deep differences between continental and common law legal systems. Despite the strong intellectual exchange, especially between France and England, Hobbes imported ideas from France, Rousseau referred to John Locke, and the ideas and concepts of Francis Bacon's empiricism became prevalent after the failure of Cromwell. Empiricism paved the way for utilitarianism-and here we have not only the key to understanding English reservations against regulatory intervention into the economy, Both historical strings, which are tied together in my discussion above, justify the assumption that the continental European understanding of freedom of contract does not comply with philosophical, historical, economic, and legal structures in England. In other words, England has paved the way for a legal system which is deeply rooted in nominalistic and utilitarian thinking. Freedom of contract lies at the crossroads of these deep roots in English intellectual history. Nominalism served to cut away the ideological barriers enshrined in the scholastic school of law and to free English contract law from the Pandectist heritage; utilitarianism went hand in hand with the rise of the English "trading state" (Handelsstaat), which has its origins in the nineteenth century. 37 The heart of English contract law lies in the freedom of commerce and the freedom to conclude contracts. Freedom of contract, therefore, means first and foremost the economic freedom to voluntarily engage in economic transactions without any risk of statutory interferences, with the exception of paying taxes to the Crown.
38
Compared to German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) and French Rationalism (Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire, Rousseau), the English view of the role and function of contract law is much more economic in its basic assumptions. It is a much smaller argumentative step from utility to economic efficiency and economic effectiveness, compared with duty, reason, will, or spirit (Pflicht, Vernunft, Wille, Verstand, Geist 44 This piece of E.U. law has led to irritation in the English system, as it submits standard terms to a general fairness test, an approach which runs counter to the ideology of the English Parliament, 45 where regulatory intervention is not meant to challenge the significance of freedom of contract in general but to solve concrete problems.
46
In conclusion, the basic formula which lies at the heart of English legal culture can be condensed into one single formula-what is useful is right. Here nominalism, empiricism and utilitarianism come together. Freedom of contract is foundational to the common law on contracts, and statutory intervention is acceptable as long as it aims at solving concrete consumer or labor concerns.
B. The French Model: Rational and Political
France has a particular historical role in the legal and theoretical discourse on the interrelationship between constitutionbuilding and the making of private legal order. The results of the French revolution are still shaping our understanding of constitutions, civil codes, "contract," and "tort" today. In only twenty years the key events in France which would define these notions occurred. In contrast, in the United Kingdom similar notions developed from an evolutionary process, where no clear-cut moment of constitution building and private legal order making can be fixed. The French Revolution led to a break with feudalistic structures 47 bourgeois society governed by individual freedom and equality of rights, which became even more visible in the Code Civil and in the French Constitution. 48 The Revolution's legacy can easily be found in the German Civil Code, which was adopted a century later.
To portray the French understanding of freedom of contract and regulation, I start from two premises. First, the vision of the French revolution, which was proclaimed in the Declaration of Human Rights, pinned down in a Constitution, and later codified in the Civil Code, has deeper social, cultural, economic, and intellectual roots. I argue that today's conception of freedom of contract in France can best be understood as a political forward-looking concept, which can be traced back to French Rationalism 49 and Descartes.
50
Secondly, French society may be characterized by the tension between intellectual projects guided by "les grandes idées,"-the French Constitution and the French Code-which strengthen the power of the Executive to the detriment of the Judiciary, and the highly politicized bottom-up resistance against an excessively far-reaching executive power. 51 The fight over "the Social"
52
-the regulatory intervention to protect workers in employment contracts and later the consumers in business to consumer (B2C) contracts-has demonstrated that setting limits to freedom of contract through statutory intervention is a highly politicized matter that is subject to potential conflicts. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 19, 95 (discussing the rise of "The Social" and its intellectual origins); from a German perspective, but taking the French impact into account, in particular Duguit, Salleilles and Gény, see Wieacker, supra note 48, at 543 § 28 ("Der Zerfall der inneren Einheit des Privatrechts und das Sozialrecht".) In that vain, law has a particular social function to fulfill. questioning of the spirit evolved from the methodological constraints of scholasticism and paved the way for a new rational method in philosophy. French philosopher Michel Eyguem de Montaigne (1533-1592) set long-lasting incentives for critical reflection of all existing knowledge and values, which later came to be known as "Enlightenment." 53 This new method to investigate the "truth" and the concept of the truth was left in the seventeenth century to Descartes, who began with his Discours de la Méthode.
Just as in England
54 Descartes claimed that a particular method to acquire the truth was needed to solve all philosophical questions. Unlike utilitarianism, Descartes believed that what is true is useful. Without Descartes's theory, it is difficult to understand the political conception of the French Civil Code. Descartes' philosophy results in the priority of theory over practice, which is the basic thesis of French intellectualism.
Based on this premise, the link between the French political project of freedom of contract and the particularities of the French legal culture become clear. Freedom of contract is first and foremost tied to the key function of the "reason," "raison," or "Vernunft" in the French civil law system. The idea is that freedom of contract is more than just an exercise to maximize mutual economic benefit. More is at stake in the communication between the parties, namely, the commitment to a contract is the product of a reasonable decision. Autonomie de la volonté is bound in the belief or assumption ("Einsicht") in a higher reason that is deeper than the individual transaction.
55 This is the Cartesian side of the concept of autonomie de la volonté. However, there is also the Rousseauean side, and it is here where the political dimension of the concept of automomie de la volonté is more obvious. Autonomie de la volonté may not be equated with individual freedom in the meaning of German idealism, which is inward looking. To the contrary, it is outward looking toward society itself and to the embedding of reason into the political environment. This is what Rousseau called the volonté générale (general will). Without Rousseau's concept of democracy and the conviction that the people will consent 53 See FRIEDELL, supra note 50.
RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE POUR BIEN CONDUIRE SA RAISON, ET CHERCHER LA VÉRITÉ DANS LES SCIENCES (1637).
55
This implies the need to look for a certain substantive equivalence in the mutual contractual relations, in German "das materielle Äquivalenzprinzip der vernunftsrechtlichen Vertragslehre." to the volonté générale, it is not possible to understand the political dimension of the concept of autonomy in the French civil code.
56
In France, there is also a peculiar understanding of the role and function of regulatory intervention in the economy to protect workers and consumers and, more in general, to restrict freedom of contract in commercial transactions through statutory regulation. Since mercantilist times, the French government played a strong role in the organization and creation of the economy. 57 The economy must follow political prerogatives in order to address social concerns and any other political requirements. What matters for our discussion is the strong connection between the role and function of the political, and the understanding of regulatory intervention. The political dimension must not necessarily materialize in a top-down fashion, i.e. through legislative acts on what nowadays is called social regulation or executive intervention into the management of the economy of the country. The political may also emerge bottom-up, through resistance on the streets against the supremacy of the state managed economy over politics.
To demonstrate the continuity of the French legal conscience (Rechtsbewußtsein) and of the breadth and depth of the political in social regulation, I will again start with reference to the implementation of E.U. Directive 99/44/EC on consumer sales. Under strong pressure from civil lawyers and civil law doctrine, the French legislature decided that, rather than integrate the rules on consumer protection into the Civil Code, it would place the respective articles in the Code de la Consommation.
58 This strategy preserved the integrity of the Civil Code as an "eternal" political project, which might be regarded as an integral part of the French identity. 59 ENZO ROPPO 241 (1976) . the 1980s after the Single European Act 62 that consumer policy became de-politicized in France.
C.
The German Model: Liberal and Authoritarian/Paternalistic
The German Civil Code is 100 years younger than the French Civil Code. In 1815, the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna and the scattered German regions that comprised various kingdoms and counties (earldoms) failed to unite into a German state under a common constitution. It took until 1871 before Germany managed, under the regime of the Prussian king and his chancellor Bismarck, to finally adopt a constitution. It took an additional thirty years before the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), as it is called in German, was enacted.
My arguments are built upon two major guiding assumptions. First, there is a direct line from Kant to Savigny to Weber and the formal rationality of the private law system, which serves to constitute the capitalist society. The Kantian philosophy inspired Savigny to formulate the so-called Historische Schule (Historical School), which was influential during the nineteenth century among private law theorists and, remarkably, continues to be influential even after the fall of the wall in 1989. 63 Historische Schule has created a particular way of thinking, favoring the transition from "The Social" to the "pure" private law system. Social issues and regulations were outsourced by a technocratic decision to specialize private law legislation outside the BGB, although adopted 100 years later than the more integrative approach of the French Code Civil. 64 This time period gave the German BGB a 62 Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986 , 1987 Both the French Code Civil and the German BGB covered tenant law. In France, tenant law has remained an integral part of the civil code, whereas German tenant law has become a legal field in itself, outsourced in special acts and only partially integrated in the BGB through the modernization of the law of obligations (Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) in 2002. For details on the development of particular ideological outlook, which maintained and defended an early nineteenth century bourgeois model of society and economy against the rising political and social transformations brought about by the industrial age and the labor movement. 65 Second, there is the link between Fichte, Hegel, Thibaut, German idealism, and legal naturalism, as expressed in Jhering, von Gierke, Ehrlich, Weber, and Kantorowicz wherein national ideals were tied to the social ideals of a society and a nation.
66 Such a vision can hardly be connected to the authoritarian Prussian state, which provided social protection to workers 67 only as a means to compensate workers for their exclusion from political participation (Sozialistengesetze 1978) . The German version of legal naturalism favors an instrumental use of social regulation, but carefully avoids and downplays the political dimension inherent in "The Social."
68
The intellectual quarrel between two German law professors, Thibaut and Savigny, over the value of a codified German Civil Code is paradigmatic for tensions arising in the German legal system: Thibaut fought enthusiastically in Heidelberg-inspired by German Idealism and les grandes idées of the French revolution-for a genuine German Code; Savigny fought brilliantly (but not enthusiastically) for the maintenance of the old Roman law.
69 Law-making in Germany in the early nineteenth century was understood as an academic exercise, quite contrary to the democratic discussion that surrounded the tenant law in Europe, see Christoph U. Schmid & Jason R. Dinse, The European Dimension of Residential Tenancy Law, 9 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 201 (2013). 65 There is a connection between the late industrialization relative to the UK, the labor movement, and the Bismarckian reaction. See, e.g 70 The outcome was a civil code that lacked the required "socialist oil." 71 This defect was remedied in the twentieth century by judges through judge-made law, and by the legislator through the adoption of numerous special laws.
German legal culture has two main components: a liberal dimension, which is shared by English law and enshrined in commercial freedom to contract; and a political dimension, which is shared by French law and enshrined in the much stronger commitment to "The Social."
72 The English streak dates back to the merging of the German Länder (states) under a tight Prussian grip, which triggered the industrial revolution and led to an amazing boost for the economy. In this context, the predominance of the market and a sense of English pragmatism can be felt. The German state, however, is not a liberalenabling state in the Anglo-Saxon sense. The German state is rooted in the authoritarian heritage of pre-democratic times. As such, the state is seen as the key regulator to realize not only economic but also political objectives, which brings German legal culture nearer to its French counterpart. However, contrary to France where the political also bears a strong top-down dimension, the political dimension in Germany is more bottom-up as it is always connected to expectations set by the citizens of the state. Today, the early Bismarkian regulatory state and the post-World War II welfare state still bears elements of authoritarian care-taking, which is different from England due to the strong interventionist side and different from France due to the lack of an open political discourse. The tension between the liberals and the ). The key to understanding the idealistic German concept of private autonomy is to appreciate its roots in the so-called "will theory" (Willenstheorie), which states that the individual is bound through his will, rather than through his declaration (Erklärung). 74 It is true that the Prussian legislator introduced corrections to the "will theory" into the BGB, which have been amplified by the judiciary in the twentieth century. Idealistic thinking embedded in the concept of private autonomy is still alive: it has been taken up by the Freiburg school, ordo-liberalism, and the private law society. 75 Its counterpart, the resistance against restrictions, more often than not bears a strong ideological bias that is outweighed 73 The Academic Draft Common Frame of Reference contains such a general part in compliance with the German BGB.
74
The "will theory" is extremely helpful because it combines European legal thought with American legal thought. by intense legislative activities in the twentieth century for the benefit of those contracting parties with weaker bargaining power.
Again, I will use Directive 99/44/EC as a blueprint to explain the continuity of the German Rechtsbewusstsein and the tension between the liberal and authoritarian views of freedom of contract. In the shadow of the so-called modernization of German contract law (Schuldrechts-Modernisierungsgesetz) in 2002, the executive, i.e., the Ministry of Justice, used the expiry of the two-year implementation period to complete the twenty-year long pending project of revising the German Civil Code, thereby "smuggling" the bulk of consumer contract law rules into the German Civil Code. This integration of Civil Code and consumer contract law perhaps was not an authoritarian, but a paternalistic move. 76 The academic debates focused almost entirely on the proposed revision of the prescription rules, in particular, on Leistungsstörungsrecht (law on the interference with or impairment of the performance of an obligation). This revision has been performed as a technical bureaucratic exercise. 77 Pragmatism might have guided German scholars to accept the development of a new sales law, as a common pattern for business to business (B2B) and B2C relations; however, contrary to France and the Netherlands, there was no deeper political discussion, especially on the possible role of consumer law as an integral part of the civil code, in the open democratic fora in Germany. Until today, consumer law has remained a foreign body in 76 There is a deeper discussion needed on the difference between (Prussian) authoritarianism and (post-Second World War) German paternalism. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. VI (1835), for a starting point on this distinction ("[a] bove this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living?"). 77 See, e.g., Stephan Lorenz, Fünf Jahre "neues" Schuldrecht im Spiegel der Rechtsprechung, 1-2 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1 (2007).
the German BGB. The integration of "The Social" has not led to an overall re-thinking of the foundations of the German BGB. Instead, the two parts, although located in the same civil code, are each rooted in their very particular intellectual history. DROIT CIVIL 29-51 (1936). theory, rather than European private law and European private law theory.
91
To understand the European model of freedom of contract, it is helpful to look at the intellectual history, and perhaps the constitutional history, of the European Union. This understanding requires a leap to the post-war period, when the European Economic Community was launched and the European Union was created. Scholars 92 advocated for the revitalization and re-invigoration of a common European culture to enable a peaceful and prosperous future for the European peoples. For example, scholars advocated for peace through economic integration, and in 1986, the Single European Act added social integration to the new European legal order.
93
Economic integration of the European Union is based on the free movement rights and competition. In particular, German academics in the ordo-liberal tradition have argued that private autonomy is enshrined into the free movement rights. 94 Economic integration aims at enabling the growth of, or paving the way for, private entrepreneurship in the ever-bigger common European market. The abundant case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the four freedoms often involves contractual disputes in which one party seeks access to the market but is barred by national statutory 91 The Oxford University Press series, where Julie Dickson and Paylos Eleftheriadis also appeared, includes an ongoing project on the philosophical foundations of private law.
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These scholars include academics such as Wieacker, Grossi, and Coing, and political scholars such as Monnet, Schuman, de Gaspari, de Gaulle, and Adenauer. 
